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I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to insider trading liability, Congress and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) intentionally play a game of “hide the
ball.” Instead of providing a clear statutory and regulatory definition of
what constitutes insider trading, Congress and the SEC, in order to preserve broad latitude for enforcement, have seemingly eschewed certainty
for obscurity.1 Following the market upheaval of the financial crisis in
2008, the United States entered a period of zealous expansion of the limits
of insider trading liability.2 This has resulted in increased SEC enforcement efforts against market participants and an expanded scope of monitored industry conduct.3 Therefore, given the obscurity of the law and the
step-up in enforcement, it is all the more important to anticipate and understand what market practices may result in liability.
One market practice that may potentially become prohibited under insider trading law is the practice of channel checking.4 Channel checking,
the analysis of the upstream suppliers and downstream consumers of a
given company’s products, is reportedly common practice in the market
analysis industry.5 However, the SEC’s interest in investigating channel
checking in the marketplace puts the legality of this practice in doubt. As
a consequence of the current broadness of insider trading liability, firms
* The author is a third-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School.
The author would like to thank John Munoz and Spencer Winters for providing invaluable
support through the publication process. The author would also like to thank the editors and
the board of the Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law.
1. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
2. Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. CORP. L.
344 (2011).
3. Id.
4. See Susan Pulliam, Insider Probe Focuses on Supply-Chain Data, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487037303045756331
73086330184.html; see also Pradheep Sampath, Channel Check – Where Supply Chains Meet
Insider Trading? ALL ABOUT B2B (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.gxsblogs.com/sampathp/2010/
11/channel-check-where-supply-chains-meet-insider-trading.html.
5. See, e.g., Pulliam, supra note 4.
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that either outsource channel checking to market analysis firms or conduct
the channel check in-house may be at risk of incurring insider trading
liability.
This note addresses the potential legality or illegality of channel checking in the context of a private equity buyout. In Part II, this note uses a
hypothetical to demonstrate a situation in which a private equity acquirer
might engage in a channel check. In Part III, this note analyzes federal
judicial and SEC cases that have developed various categories of insider
trading liability, and provides a framework for insider trading liability. In
Part IV, this note applies the analysis from Part III to the hypothetical
described in Part II. Part IV attempts to reach a conclusion about
whether the private equity acquirer, who engages in channel checking,
could be found liable for insider trading given the current law. Part IV
asks whether channel checkers should face potential insider trading liability, and concludes that the SEC’s newfound focus on channel checking
should be directed to regulating more harmful conduct.
II. MOTIVATING CHANNEL CHECKING HYPOTHETICAL
This part of the note provides a hypothetical involving a private equity
firm looking to acquire one of two similar companies. The firm conducts a
channel check, a reportedly common market analysis tool in order to aid
its decision. This is a plausible scenario in which a firm might use a channel check to its advantage, but may also expose itself to insider trading
liability.
The private equity firm of Byun, Munoz, & Winters (better known as
“BMW”), perceiving the need to further diversify its investment portfolio,
is considering an acquisition in the technology sector. The management of
BMW, a little too enamored with the hype of Apple’s iPad line, believes
that tablet PCs are the wave of the future and will soon replace laptops
and personal computers. In order to capitalize on the growth of this new
technology, BMW is zeroing in on several candidates for a leveraged
buyout.
The firm has narrowed the field to two candidates. The first target,
Peppers Electronics, Inc., is a Delaware corporation publicly traded on
several national stock exchanges. Second, BMW has also targeted Miller
Technologies, Inc., another publicly traded Delaware corporation. To
BMW, both targets are substantially similar in all discernible respects. According to the corporations’ financial statements, both generate similar net
income and have similarly clean balance sheets ideal for a buyout target.6
However, due to limited resources, BMW can only acquire one of these
companies.
6. This is a gross oversimplification of the process through which PE firms make investment decisions, but for the purposes of this note, it is only necessary to demonstrate in
general terms that the two firms are substantially similar investments.
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Research into the two companies yields that both would be ideal for a
BMW acquisition; the firm could essentially flip a coin and choose between two identical acquisitions. On the other hand, BMW could try to
dig deeper into information about the firms in order to find some way of
determining the better of the two investments. BMW does not want to
acquire the wrong company, and so it chooses to dig a little deeper into
information about the two firms.7 Since the impetus for this acquisition
first came from BMW’s strong desire to acquire a company with a line of
tablet PCs, BMW decides to find a way to measure the performance of
each target company’s tablet PCs.
Unfortunately, BMW does not have much information to work with
regarding the sales performance of each company’s respective tablet PC
lines other than cursory sales figures, which the target companies release
to the public.8 BMW wants to know more. For instance, what are the
sales figures going to look like a year from now? In order to remedy this
dearth of information, BMW resorts to looking outside the company for
sources of information. It decides to conduct a channel check.9 It contacts
Peppers’ and Miller’s suppliers—companies that produce the various widgets that the target companies use to assemble their tablet PCs—and
coaxes information from each supplier about the each target’s orders for
the next year. BMW repeats this inquiry with the targets’ distributors.
The suppliers and distributors inform BMW that they have previously entered into confidentiality agreements with the target companies as a condition of doing business. After the initial hesitation, however, they all
ultimately comply with BMW’s requests. The suppliers and distributors of
each company fear that not complying with BMW’s requests for information would cause friction and damage their future business prospects if
BMW does indeed acquire either company.
BMW has concluded from the information gleaned from the suppliers
and distributors that Peppers’ tablet PC sales figures will continue to rise
over the next six months, while Miller’s sales will decline considerably.
Armed with evidence that Peppers’ earnings will outstrip Miller’s in the
near future, BMW proceeds with the acquisition of Peppers by buying out
the existing shareholders of the corporation. Although long-form mergers
are a much more common business combination structure utilized in these
types of deals, BMW decides that in this case a tender offer is preferable.
7. Most acquirers at this point would reach out to management. After initial courting,
if management is receptive, the parties will then sign a non-disclosure agreement, and the
acquirer will start its due diligence process. This creates a relationship of trust between the
two parties, and from this point on the acquirer must choose carefully what he is to do with
information it obtains.
8. Let us assume for the purposes of this exercise that both companies have chosen
not to disclose very much information to the market beyond the current sales figures of their
tablet PC lines.
9. Alternatively, BMW can outsource the task to a market analysis company. As we
will see in Part III, BMW would not be able to insulate itself from liability by outsourcing the
channel check.
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A tender offer will allow the firm to go directly to the shareholders of the
target company with the deal, bypassing the various legal requirements of
standard long-form mergers, allowing the firm to close the acquisition
much more quickly.10
By using information it obtained from the suppliers and distributors of
the two companies in order to choose the acquisition target, BMW makes
a trading decision based on information gathered from a channel check.
Given that BMW recently learned that the SEC has taken an interest in
expanding insider trading liability to the practice of channel checking,
management is nervous about a potential lawsuit. Assuming the SEC does
go after the firm for insider trading, BMW would like a law firm to analyze
whether a federal court is likely to find BMW liable for insider trading for
its actions related to this transaction.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

OF

INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

Before determining whether BMW is potentially liable for insider trading, this next part of the note establishes the legal framework for insider
trading liability. It is important to understand the current legal framework
for insider trading liability because, absent the development and acceptance of new theories of liability, the SEC is limited to working within its
confines in any new enforcement effort.
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the “classical theory” of insider trading liability.11 The Court held that trading on
the basis of material, non-public information constitutes insider trading if
the trader owes a duty to disclose such information or abstain from trading
altogether (“duty to disclose or abstain”). A trader owes this duty to disclose or abstain only where a fiduciary relationship exists between the
trader and the shareholders of the corporation. Therefore, classical theory
liability only captures conduct by true insiders of the corporation.12 Following Chiarella, courts developed several other theories of liability in order to remedy the central problem of classical theory liability, namely, its
failure to prohibit seemingly wrongful conduct by non-insiders. Temporary insider theory extends insider-like duties to a non-insider professional
who gains access to inside information in his vital capacity as an advisor of
the corporation. Misappropriation theory bases liability on the fiduciary
relationship between the trader and the source of the inside information,
rather than the trader’s status as an insider of the corporation. Tippee
liability extends liability to a non-insider tippee who trades on the basis of
inside information obtained in violation of the tipper’s fiduciary duty. The
immediate following sections of Part III explore the classic theory, tempo10. See Sasha Dai, Bain ‘Confident’ about Its $1.8B Tender Offer for Gymboree, WALL
ST. J. PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (Oct. 13, 2010, 7:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/
2010/10/13/bain-confident-about-its-18b-tender-offer-for-gymboree.
11. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
12. The terms “insider” or “true insider” are used in this note to denote persons that
are fiduciaries of the traded-in corporation’s shareholders.
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rary insider theory, misappropriation theory, and the tippee liability,
respectively.
A. § 10(b) and the Classical Theory of Insider Trading
The term “insider trading” is not mentioned in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). Yet, this has not stopped the SEC and
federal courts from shaping anti-fraud regulation as it applies to insider
trading and other similar offenses. The broad and opaque language of the
Exchange Act gives these actors enormous leeway in determining the
scope of anti-fraud regulation since the passage of the Exchange Act.13
Thus, the SEC and the courts have interpreted § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, which prohibits the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device. . .in
connection with purchase or sale of any security,”14 and SEC Rule 10b-5
implementing the statute,15 as prohibiting insider trading.16
In 1961, the SEC first articulated the classical theory of insider trading
liability in In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.17 The SEC ruled that a
corporate insider, who by virtue of his position within a company obtains
access to material non-public information,18 has a duty to disclose such
information before trading or to abstain from trading in the corporation’s
securities altogether (“duty to disclose or abstain”).19 Therefore, a corporate insider trading his corporation’s securities on the basis of material
non-public information would be liable for insider trading if he did not
disclose such information before trading.
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court adopted the SEC’s articulation of
classical theory liability in Cady, Roberts & Co.20 However, the Court also
held that a trader’s duty to disclose or abstain arises only when a fiduciary
relationship exists between the trader and the shareholders of the tradedin corporation.21 Therefore, the Court clarified that the “corporate insider” in Cady, Roberts & Co. is necessarily someone who is a fiduciary of
the corporation’s shareholders, and that only these corporate insiders can
13. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 572.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
16. E.g. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (noting that federal courts had long found § 10(b)
violations where insiders had used undisclosed information for personal benefit).
17. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 SEC
Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
18. Although § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 are invoked in a variety of
different types of actions relating to securities fraud, the Supreme Court ruled in Basic v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988), that one standard of materiality applies in all § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 cases. The standard is whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider that the information in question altered the total mix of information
available.
19. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
20. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. See id. at 228.
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be liable for insider trading. Thus, non-insiders who somehow obtain and
trade on the basis of material non-public information cannot be liable for
possessing an informational advantage over the market under the classical
theory of liability.22 The Court stated that to hold otherwise would create
a “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material nonpublic information.”–23 The reason why the
Court relied on a fiduciary relationship between the parties was that the
Court viewed insider trading as a tool for preventing corporate insiders
from taking advantage of uninformed minority shareholders.24 Its purpose was not to ensure informational parity in the marketplace.
Accordingly in Chiarella, the Court found that the defendant, Vincent
Chiarella, a markup man in the offices of a financial printer who profited
from the information he gleaned from documents received on the job,25
owed no fiduciary or similar duty to the selling shareholders. Therefore,
he did not violate § 10(b).26 Although the government argued that the
defendant was guilty under the alternative theory of misappropriation,27
the Court declined to rule on the merits of this theory since it was never
presented before the jury at trial, leaving open the issue of liability under
the misappropriation theory for another day.28
Despite the open issue of the misappropriation theory, the Chiarella
ruling, nonetheless, had significant consequences. It marked the first time
the Supreme Court’s express recognition of insider trading liability, thus
affirming a significant source of enforcement activity by the SEC. However, the Court also made clear that liability for insider trading also requires a finding of a fiduciary or similar type of relationship between the
trader and the shareholders of the corporation, rather than a mere showing that the trader possessed an informational advantage. Therefore, it set
a threshold for liability, narrowed what constituted insider trading, and
established a substantial defense against a claim for insider trading. If the
defendant, Chiarella, had been an employee of either of the two parties to
the merger, he would certainly have been guilty of insider trading. Al22.

Id. at 235.

23.

See id. at 233.

24.

Id. at 228-29 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951)).

25. Id. at 224. Chiarella deduced from the information he received while on the job
that a corporation was about to make a tender offer for the shares of another corporation.
He subsequently purchased shares of the target corporation on the open market. When the
tender offer was announced to the public, the price of the shares appreciated and he was able
to sell the shares he previously purchased for a profit.
26.

See id. at 231-32.

27. The Government based this theory of liability around the fact that Chiarella had
misappropriated the information from his employer. Id. at 235-36. Therefore, liability for
misappropriation is based on a violation of duty owed to the source of the information, not to
the other party in the transaction or to company whose securities are being traded. See infra
Part III.C. below for more on the “misappropriation” theory.
28.

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
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though Chiarella traded on the basis of secret information, he escaped liability precisely because he was not technically an “insider.”
B. Temporary Insider Theory
The “temporary insider” theory is an extension of the classical theory
of insider trading liability. It developed as a partial response to the central
problem arising from the high fiduciary threshold established by the holding in Chiarella, namely, the inability of the classical theory to capture
wrongful conduct by non-insiders. Temporary insider theory addresses the
threat of trading by outside professionals who gain access to sensitive information by virtue of their role as essential advisors to the corporation.
In this case, these outsiders obtain access to material non-public information, but are not technically employees or insiders, and therefore, would
likely escape liability under the classical theory of liability.
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, the Second Circuit ruled that an underwriter that had obtained confidential information while providing services
for a client had committed insider trading by passing along that information to its other clients.29 In footnote 14 of Dirks v. SEC—a case that was
decided under another theory of liability, discussed below, but in which
the Court nevertheless addressed the topic of temporary insiders—the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that when a company reveals confidential
information for legitimate corporate purposes to certain outside professionals, such as underwriters, lawyers, accountants, or management consultants, these outsiders are then considered temporary fiduciaries of the
shareholders of the company.30 Thus, this theory allows courts and the
SEC to sidestep the narrow Chiarella holding by temporarily extending
insider-like duties to an outsider who temporarily gains access to inside
information.31
C. Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory, like the temporary insider theory, addresses the classical theory’s inability to capture wrongful conduct by noninsiders. However, unlike the classical or temporary insider theories, it
does not rely on the trader’s status as an actual or constructive insider of
the corporation. Rather, liability is based on the existence of a fiduciary
29. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d. Cir.
1974). Although this is a tippee liability case, the court did not premise liability of the underwriter on a preexisting fiduciary relationship. Prentice, supra note 2, at 353. Therefore, this
decision supports the theory that a party does not need to actually be a traditional corporate
insider to be liable as if he were an insider.
30. Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n. 14 (1982) (citing, for example,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 (2d. Cir. 1979) (noting that outsiders can obtain inside information due to their special relationship with a company)).
31. It is easy to imagine what the Court envisions here. For example, outside accounting firms must have access to inside information when auditing the financial statements of a
client corporation.
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relationship between the trader and the source of the insider information.
Therefore, the trader need not be an insider of the corporation. In
Chiarella, the Government argued that the defendant had engaged in activity that seemed inherently unfair and inappropriate.32 While Chiarella
was not an insider, the Government argued that he had nonetheless misappropriated information rightfully belonging to other parties.33 However,
the Court declined to address the Government’s misappropriation argument. The Court returned to the question eighteen years after Chiarella in
United States v. O’Hagan and validated the misappropriation theory.34
James O’Hagan was a partner of a law firm representing a potential
acquirer in a tender offer transaction. Although he was not personally
assigned to represent the client, he was aware of the potential transaction.
In anticipation of the upcoming tender offer announcement and the commensurate jump in the price of target corporation stock, O’Hagan purchased shares of the target corporation stock. After the announcement,
the price increased as anticipated, and O’Hagan reaped a sizeable profit
from the transaction.35 O’Hagan was initially convicted on the basis of
misappropriation theory, but the conviction was reversed by the Eighth
Circuit, only to be reversed again by the Supreme Court.
In overruling the Eight Circuit, the Supreme Court first held that misappropriation was a fraudulent act prohibited by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.36
The Court reasoned that, by using information that a source entrusted to
him in confidence, a misappropriator—a fiduciary of the source of inside
information—defrauds the source by converting the information for personal gain.37 Therefore, under the misappropriation theory, the duty to
abstain or disclose is owed to the source of the information, rather than
the corporation and its shareholders, and a fiduciary relationship must exist between the trader and the source.38 The Court ruled that this type of

32.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980).

33.

Id. at 235-36.

34.

United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997).

35.

Id. at 647-48.

36.

Id. at 653.

37.

Id. at 653-54.

38. But note that in certain cases, misappropriation and the classical theory overlap.
For instance, when the misappropriator is also a company insider, then the source and the
corporation are one and the same, and both theories will operate to reach the same result.
See Robert A. Prentice, supra note 2, at 351-52 (noting that misappropriation overlaps with
other theories of insider trading liability in certain circumstances). In O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997), however, the defendant’s liability based on the classical and temporary insider theories would have been in doubt. The defendant’s employer was the law firm representing the
acquirer in a merger transaction, meaning that O’Hagan traded in shares of the target. Since
his law firm was not representing the target corporation, and since he did not personally
provide any services, O’Hagan would most likely not have been considered a temporary
insider.
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deception by misappropriation was consistent with the language of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.39
Second, the Court held that the misappropriation in question satisfied
the requirement in § 10(b) that the fraud be “in connection with the
purchase or sale” of securities.40 Finally, the Court noted that prosecution
of misappropriation is in tune with the “animating purpose” of the Exchange Act: to promote investor confidence by insuring that securities
markets are honest.41 The Court found no reason to hold a trader that has
profited from the use of confidential information liable for fraud if he is a
fiduciary of the shareholders of the issuing corporation.42 In either case,
the Court observed, the negative impact on the market would be
identical.43
Therefore, even in cases where an outsider, who owes no duty to the
corporation or its shareholders, trades that corporation’s shares on the basis of material non-public information, he may be liable for insider trading
through the misappropriation theory. Unlike classical theory liability, the
misappropriator must be a fiduciary of the source of the inside information, rather than the corporation’s shareholders. The misappropriator
must then trade on the basis of the information in violation of the confidence of the source. Thus, like the classical theory, this theory of insider
trading liability is still grounded in the fiduciary duty owed to another
party, rather than the possession of an informational advantage.
D. Tippee Liability
Like the misappropriation and temporary insider theories, tippee liability rectifies the inability of classical theory liability to reach non-insiders. Tippee liability, functions by extending the tipper’s breach of duty to
traders who otherwise would not be considered fiduciaries of either the
shareholders of the corporation or the original source of the information.
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a tippee might benefit
by trading on the basis of an inside tip. Take for example the case of a
CEO who informs a close friend that he should sell his shares of the
CEO’s corporation. The corporation will be revealing previous overstatements of earnings, and the stock price will surely take a hit. The friend
39. See id. (“We agree. . .that misappropriation, as just defined, satisfies §10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a ‘deceptive device or contrivance. . ..’).
40. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (“We agree. . .that misappropriation, as just defined,
satisfies §10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a ‘deceptive device or
contrivance. . ..’).
41. Id. at 658.
42. See id. at 659 (“[I]t makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O’Hagan a § 10(b)
violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he
works for a law firm representing the bidder.”).
43. See id. at 652 (noting that the classical and misappropriation theories are complementary, each targeting situations in which insiders or outsiders harm the integrity of the
securities markets by attempting to capitalize on nonpublic information).
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willingly acts on the CEO’s tip, even though he knows the CEO should not
be disclosing this type of information ahead of the public announcement.
The stock price plummets after the announcement, but the friend has
avoided loss.
The classical, misappropriation, and temporary insider theories are insufficient to capture the tippee’s conduct. Under Chiarella, a tippee does
not become a fiduciary of the corporation just by virtue of possessing confidential information regarding the corporation.44 Therefore, without the
requisite fiduciary relationship between the tippee and the corporation’s
shareholders, a tippee cannot be liable under the classical theory. Alternatively, for misappropriation theory to apply, the tippee must perpetrate
some fraud on the source of the information. In this case, the source of
the information, i.e. the CEO, fully expects the tippee to trade on the basis
of the information he has supplied. Finally, the tippee cannot be considered a temporary insider of the corporation because he is not a professional gaining access to the information in his capacity as an outside
advisor.
Yet tippees are not completely insulated from insider trading liability.
A tippee who receives confidential information through a tipper’s breach
of the duty to abstain or disclose may share responsibility for the breach
under certain circumstances. In other words, the tippee may be contributorily or secondarily liable. The Court expressly endorsed and established
the elements of tippee liability in Dirks v. SEC.45
In Dirks, the Court held that a tipper who breaches his duty to the
shareholders or the source of the information by passing along the information to the tippee also transfers the breach of duty to the tippee.46
Since the tippee’s liability arises from his after-the-fact participation in the
insider’s breach, the tippee is only liable if the tippee knows or should
have known that the tipper breached his fiduciary duty by passing along
the tip.47 The tip constitutes a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty only if
he personally benefits, directly or indirectly, from the tip (the “personal
benefit test”).48 This test may be satisfied if there is evidence of a monetary gain, reputational benefit leading to future earnings, or a gift of confidential information to a relative or a friend.49 Finally, tippee liability also
extends to second tier tippees, traders who obtain inside information from
other tippees. In this case, a second tier tippee is liable if he knows or
should have known of the original tipper’s breach.50
44.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).

45.

Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646.

46.

Id. at 659.

47.

Id. at 660.

48.

Id. at 662.

49.

Id. at 663-64.

50. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding the
tippee to the tippee liable for insider trading).
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Therefore, the friend in our example would not be able to escape liability for insider trading based on the argument that he is not a fiduciary of
the corporation’s shareholders. Instead, as long as he knows or should
have known that the CEO was breaching his duty to abstain or disclose by
tipping him, and as long as there is a personal benefit accruing to the director as a result of the tip—even intangible benefit—he will be liable for
insider trading as a tippee. If the friend passed along the tip to others who
then traded on the basis of the tip, they could also be liable as second tier
tippees.
E. Misappropriation Theory and Tippee Liability
A tippee may obtain information from two different types of tippers.
First, a tipper may be tipped by an insider, in breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders. In this case, tippee liability
extends classical theory liability to non-insiders. Second, a tipper may be
tipped by a misappropriator, in breach of the misappropriator’s duty to the
source of the information.51 In this case, tippee liability extends misappropriation theory liability.
Although the courts have not expressly clarified the reasoning behind
universal application of tippee liability, one obvious justification is that a
non-insider misappropriator, as a fiduciary of the source of the confidential information, has the same duty to protect non-public information as
any corporate insider. Although the duty is owed to different parties in
each case, there is no difference in the duty itself. Therefore, since the
duty to protect non-public information applies identically in both cases, a
tippee is contributorily liable when he acts on information that breached
the tipper’s duty, regardless of whether the tipper is an insider or a noninsider misappropriator.
An unresolved question arising from the application of tippee liability
to extend misappropriation theory liability is whether a finding of tippee
liability depends on a showing of personal benefit to the tipper. Although
the SEC does not dispute the tippee liability requirements as established
in Dirks for classical theory cases, the SEC distinguishes tippee liability
requirements in misappropriation cases. The SEC contends that the prosecution only needs to show that the tipper acted with severe recklessness
in providing information to the tippee in order to establish a breach of
duty; a showing of benefit gained by the tipper need not occur to extend
liability to the tippee.52 This view is supported by United States. v. Libera,
in which the Second Circuit ruled that, for misappropriation cases, a showing of tippee’s knowledge was sufficient to establish liability without more
because a tip of confidential information is “not for nothing,” but instead
demonstrates severe recklessness on the part of the tipper in sharing the
51. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (citing United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d
596, 600 (2d Cir. 1996)); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
52. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
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information with the tippee.53 In SEC v. Musella, a district court noted, in
dictum, that no showing of personal benefit is required in misappropriation cases.54
However, the Eleventh Circuit split from the Second Circuit in SEC v.
Yun, where it held that the personal benefit rule applies to both misappropriation and classic theory tippee liability cases.55 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that there was no cause to treat misappropriation tippees any
differently from classic insider tippees.56 Consequently, in order to establish tippee liability, the tipper must have breached his duty to the shareholders of the corporation or the source of the information by tipping. In
the Eleventh Circuit at least, the tipper must also have received a personal
benefit from sharing the information with the tippee in every case. In the
Second Circuit, if the tipper is a misappropriator, then the tipper must
have only been severely reckless by providing the tippee with material,
non-public information.
F. Resulting Framework
From the cases discussed above, it is possible to create a framework of
insider trading liability. Under the classical theory, a trader is liable for
insider trading if he trades on the basis of material non-public information
in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders of the traded-in
corporation. Therefore, because of the fiduciary relationship requirement,
the trader must be an insider of the corporation in order to be liable under
the classical theory. Alternatively, under misappropriation theory, a
trader is liable if he trades on the basis of material non-public information
in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information.
Therefore, in this case the trader need not be an insider of the corporation.
Temporary insider theory extends classical theory liability to outside professionals who trade on the basis of material non-public information
gained by virtue of their position as advisors to the corporation. Tippee
liability extends liability to non-insider tippees who obtain material nonpublic information from either insiders of the corporation or misappropriators. Having established the basis legal framework of insider trading liability, this note proceeds to discuss BMW’s liability in Part IV.
IV. APPLICATION

OF

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

TO

HYPOTHETICAL

Having established the framework for insider trading liability, Part IV
of this note will apply this framework to the hypothetical described in Part
53. Libera, 989 F.2d at 601-02. An alternative reading of this opinion is that the issue
of personal benefit was never in doubt, and so was not addressed by the court.
54. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). For
criticism of this case, see Jeffery Plotkin, The Tipper Benefit Test Under the Misappropriation
Theory, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 2003.
55. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1279.
56. Id. at 1277.
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II. The purpose of this application is to determine whether the SEC would
be able to sustain an insider trading charge against BMW if BMW’s act of
channel checking comes under SEC scrutiny. This section concludes by
asking whether imposing liability for channel checking makes sense, or
whether the SEC should instead direct its resources and enforcement efforts to other areas of industry conduct.
A. Did BMW engage in insider trading?
There are several questions to answer before a reaching a conclusion
about BMW’s liability for channel checking. First, there is the threshold
question of the importance of the information obtained by BMW through
its channel checking—that is, whether the information was material. Second, this section must determine which theory of insider trading would
most likely apply to BMW’s actions. If BMW is not directly liable through
either the classical or misappropriation theory, the company may be liable
under temporary insider theory or tippee liability.
1. Materiality
The information obtained by BMW through channel checking is likely
material. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court
ruled that material information is that material which has a substantial
likelihood to have actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable
shareholder.57 In other words, material information is information that
would be viewed by a reasonable investor as having altered the total mix
of available information. In the context of insider trading, courts have
interpreted material information as that which is “reasonably certain to
have a substantial effect on the market price.”58 Information that is “sufficiently directed to the matter of earnings” would satisfy this standard.59 In
the hypothetical, the tippers’ information was reasonably certain to have a
substantial effect on the market price because it was sufficiently directed
to the matter of earnings. The information obtained by BMW indicated
that the earnings of the two companies would soon diverge, and BMW
thought this information was important enough to base its decision on it.
2. Liability Under Classical, Misappropriation, and Temporary
Insider Theory
BMW would likely not be liable directly under the classical or misappropriation theory of insider trading. Additionally, it would not be considered a temporary insider. First, because BMW is not a fiduciary of either
of the target companies, the classical theory does not apply to it under
Chiarella. Second, BMW is not liable directly under misappropriation the57. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
58. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977)).
59. Id. at 167.
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ory because it has not breached any duty owed to the source of the information, the suppliers and the distributors of the two companies. BMW is
not a fiduciary of the sources, nor did the sources ever have an expectation
that BMW would keep the information confidential. The sources knew
exactly for what purpose BMW was using the information. Finally, BMW
cannot be considered a temporary insider of the target companies because
it is not an outside advisor of either of the two companies, and because it
did not actually receive any information from the companies themselves
for a corporate purpose. Therefore, if BMW is to be held liable for insider
trading for its channel checking activities, it must be through tippee
liability.
3. Tippee liability
A tippee is liable if the tipper breached his fiduciary duty to either the
corporation’s shareholders or the source of the information by sharing material non-public information with the tippee. First, in order for the tippee
to be liable, the tipper must have actually violated a duty owed to the
source of the information when he shared that information with the tippee. Second, the tipper must have given the tip in order to gain some
personal benefit. Finally, the tippee must have known or should have
known that his receiving the information constitutes a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders or the source of the
information.60 As noted in Part III, there is a split between the Second
and the Eleventh Circuits regarding whether these requirements are uniformly applied in situations where the tipper is a misappropriator as opposed to an insider. This note applies both approaches and concludes that
BMW would likely be liable for insider trading through tippee liability in
any circuit.
In the BMW hypothetical, there is a question whether a formal fiduciary relationship needs to be proved between the suppliers, the distributors,
and the two target companies in order to show a duty existed between the
parties to protect non-public information. Under misappropriation theory, some courts have held that a formal fiduciary relationship need not be
proved between a misappropriator and his source in order for a duty to
nonetheless exist between the two parties.61 For example, in SEC v. Yun,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that there were circumstances in which a reasonable expectation of confidentiality could exist even without a fiduciary
or similar relationship or an express confidentiality agreement.62 Additionally, SEC Rule 10b5-2 also states that “a person has a duty of trust or
60.
theory).

See supra Part III.C (laying out the elements of a claim under the misappropriation

61. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). But see
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d. Cir. 1991) (holding that there must exist a strict
fiduciary-like relationship between the misappropriator and the source of the information).
62.

See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273,
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confidence for purposes of the ‘misappropriation theory’ of insider trading. . .[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence.63
The SEC appears then to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s broader prohibition of information sharing. In other words, the information shared need
not be protected under a formal fiduciary obligation. Instead, the mere
expectation that the information will be kept confidential is sufficient to
give rise to the duty to disclose or abstain. The hypothetical in Part II
details the fact that the distributors and suppliers of the target companies
entered into a signed agreement to keep the information shared confidential. However, even without the formal signed agreement, the materiality
of the information exchanged and the hesitation on the part of the suppliers and distributors to share information with BMW may be sufficient evidence of an agreement between parties to protect non-public information.
Therefore, the SEC and courts following the Eleventh Circuit approach
would likely rule that BMW’s sources, the suppliers and distributors of the
two companies, had a duty not to share the information with BMW.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit requires a strict fiduciary-like
relationship between the trader and the source of the information. Such a
relationship may not be easily established in the BMW hypothetical.
However, even circuits that take a more strict approach to the duty requirement, such as the Second Circuit, have found that an expressly signed
confidentiality agreement between parties may give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain.64 Given that the sources here had signed confidentiality
agreements with the target companies as a condition of doing business
with them, the Second Circuit may likely find that parties owed a duty to
disclose or abstain.
It is debatable whether the second requirement for finding tippee liability—the requirement that the tipper derive personal benefit from sharing non-public information with the tippee—is satisfied in the BMW
hypothetical. In Dirks, the Supreme Court ruled that a tipper cannot
breach his duty without deriving a personal benefit from sharing the information, and consequently no liability transfers to the tippee.65 As noted
in Part III, there is a split in the circuits regarding the universal applicability of the personal benefit requirement. A majority of the circuits, including the Eleventh Circuit, hold that personal benefit is a uniform
requirement. On the other hand, a minority of circuits, including the Second Circuit and the SEC,66 hold that that personal benefit is not required
in misappropriation cases.
63.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012).

64. E.g. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (holding that absent an express acceptance, a duty
of confidentiality could be implied only through a pre-existing fiduciary-like relationship between the parties).
65.

Dirks v. Security & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).

66. For example, in United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600-62 (2d Cir. 1993), the
Second Circuit ruled that the fact that the tippers had knowingly violated their employer’s
confidentiality agreement was sufficient to establish breach of a fiduciary duty. Since no per-
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The facts in the BMW hypothetical suggest that a court requiring proof
of personal benefit on the part of the tippee would likely find such threshold has been met. If the personal benefit test must first be satisfied, the
fact that the tippers provided BMW with the information sought in order
to preserve future business prospects would likely suffice to meet this test.
If no personal benefit test is required, then the fact that the tippers violated the confidentiality agreement by sharing information with BMW is
alone sufficient to establish a breach of trust.67
Finally, BMW was aware that the tippers were providing information
in violation of tippers’ confidentiality agreements. Although the tippers
eventually complied with BMW’s request for information, they first informed BMW of the existence of the confidentiality agreements. This
would be enough to establish BMW’s actual knowledge that it was receiving the information in breach of the tippers’ duties to the target companies. Therefore, this fact alone would satisfy the requirement that the
tippee must know or should have known of the tipper’s breach of duty.68
Therefore, the SEC, and likely most federal circuit courts too, would
find BMW secondarily liable for insider trading pursuant to the tippee theory when it engaged in channel checking. The information that serves as
BMW’s basis for trading is material and confidential. BMW’s tippers
owed a duty to the target companies to keep information about the companies’ supply and distribution numbers confidential, and it subsequently
breached this duty by tipping BMW for personal gain. Finally, BMW
knew that it was receiving the information as a result of the tippers’ breach
of duty. Even if BMW had outsourced the channel check to a market
analyst, this conclusion would not change because BMW would then be
considered a second tier tippee and suitably liable.
B. Does it make sense to impose liability for channel checking?
There are circumstances in which imposing liability for channel checking makes sense. The central purpose of the prohibition of insider trading
is to preserve the integrity of the capital markets by protecting the general
investing public from being taken advantage of by persons acting on the
basis of information obtained through improper means.69 Therefore,
when the policy rationale and the legal results are in congruence, imposing
insider-trading liability for channel checking is justified. For example, analysts and their clients should be punished where improperly obtained information allows clients of the analysts to be avoid large losses due to a
negative earnings surprise. Here, the law operates to prevent a certain
sonal benefit requirement is mentioned by the court, this ruling may suggest that merely
violating a confidentiality agreement constitutes a breach, at least for the purposes of tippee
liability
67.
68.
69.

See id.
See Dirks 463 U.S. at 647.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997).
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group of advantaged individuals from transferring losses to the unsuspecting investing public.
However, in other cases, the legal results are not strongly supported by
a policy justification. The hypothetical of BMW is one such example.
Why should the SEC go after BMW for insider trading when the shareholders of Peppers and the investing public have not been harmed? In
fact, the information will likely lead to the shareholders realizing a premium over the market price of their shares, and it will allow BMW to
make the smarter investment decision. It seems strange that the SEC
should punish an action that ultimately benefits investors.
Additionally, it would make more sense to allow the shareholders of
Miller, the company in the hypothetical that BMW rejected, to bring a
private action against BMW. However, the law under current interpretations is not likely to permit this cause of action.70 Finally, it is not clear
that the shareholders of Miller ought to be allowed to take BMW to court,
because the policy justification can cut in favor of BMW. In the long run,
it may be more beneficial for the market to allow buyers to pursue deals
that have a better chance of succeeding.
Although the extent to which channel checking is a prevalent practice
in the marketplace is unclear, this note demonstrates that it can be a powerful and effective tool, particularly in the field of private equity acquisitions. Despite the fact that it likely is not an overtly harmful practice,
current insider trading law allows the SEC and the courts to punish a private equity firm that chooses to engage in a channel check.
V. CONCLUSION
By applying the facts of the motivating hypothetical to the current legal framework of insider trading law, this note shows that at least in certain circumstances, a company in BMW’s position could be found liable
for insider trading by obtaining and trading on the basis of information
obtained from suppliers and distributors of mergers and acquisitions
targets. The suppliers and distributors, the tippers in this case, could be
misappropriators of confidential information, and BMW would be secondarily liable under tippee liability. However, just because a certain legal
result can be obtained does not mean that it should be. In cases where
there is little policy justification for expanding insider-trading liability to
previously un-prohibited marketplace practices, there is little advantage to
70. See Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitues for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV.
235, 251-60 (2001). The authors conclude that in many circumstances, trading in stock substitutes, one facet of which is the practice of using inside information to trade alternatively in a
rival company, is legal. Ostensibly, shareholders of the spurned company would not have
standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 because they cannot meet the rule articulated in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975), that plaintiffs in private 10b-5 actions
must have traded in the same stock as the defendant. In this case, the plaintiffs are holding
stock, not trading, and the stock they are holding is not the same as those in which the
defendant is trading. Id.
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doing so. Despite the lack of a policy justification for imposing insidertrading liability for channel checking, this note shows that the current laws
allow the courts to extend insider trading liability to this practice. Therefore, a private equity firm would do well to take this into consideration
before engaging in a channel check.

